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Leaving the Straight Path: Cultural 
Time Travel in the Seventies
MARK WILLIAMS
Victoria University of Wellington
In 1986, the Canadian poet, George Bowering, published a poem in Landfall 
which describes encountering the past when you visit New Zealand:
 Everyone agrees,
 when you visit New Zealand
 you are back in the Fifties.
 The Fifties! My father is still alive!
 I looked round for him on the long main street of Wellington.
 I kept turning on Cuba Street to see if he was behind me.
 I listened for his quiet voice in the Auckland airport.
 I lifted the brims of bent sheepmen sʼ hats, looking for his face.1
Here the gap between the present time of the rest of the world and the 
marooned time of New Zealand is a mere matter of three decades. It 
lacks the grand scale with which New Zealanders have often represented 
themselves to the rest of the world as separated by tracts of time as well 
as distance. For a country conscious of its youth, New Zealand has been 
surprisingly keen to image itself by way of antiquity: pastoral scenes, sublime 
mountains, a noble and ancient race draw the eye backwards in time. At 
the international Exhibition held in Christchurch in 1906-1907, a model 
pa displayed a perfectly preserved ancient race to visitors. As a traditional 
people, the Maori participants were even forbidden to use the mouth organ to 
accompany their songs.2 A century later, the 100% Pure NZ campaign still 
attracts tourists with the prospect of Maori culture in the picture postcard 
poses of antiquity cultivated in the late colonial period. George Bowering sʼ 
New Zealand is not the exotic Maoriland of moko and traditional dance 
or the primeval scenery of Peter Jackson sʼ Lord of the Rings; it is merely 
a provincial version of the rest of the world, nostalgic, charming, amusing, 
vaguely irrelevant.
For those of us who grew up, placidly enough, in the ﬁfties only to feel 
the pull of the modern in the early seventies, Bowering sʼ New Zealand as 
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a place one enters by so trivial an act of time travel is more discouraging 
than the vertiginous leaps into imagined pasts offered by ﬁlm and tourism. 
It evokes the shameful sense of being just behind – not romantic inhabitants 
of an imaginary unspoiled world but lagging citizens of the actual one. 
This is the source of embarrassment the baby boomers have struggled to 
eradicate over the last 30 years.
I associate the seventies with two related conditions: belatedness and 
embarrassment. The ﬁrst condition was a product of coming just after the 
culture heroes of the sixties – the generation born around 1946 – who had 
already noisily broken with the rules of normalcy and decency that had 
governed post-war New Zealand. In the year I started university – the ﬁrst 
of the new decade – I was well aware that others had made more outrageous 
gestures of opposition than I had courage for. Besides, I was ill-equipped for 
the strenuous demands of drug-taking and promiscuity; I lacked cool, I was 
easily embarrassed and, like most of my peers, I did not wish permanently 
to abandon the straight path, merely to visit the wild places.
Let me cite one small diversion from that path: the journey from 
Wanganui in the summer of 1970 up a dusty metalled road where sheep 
trucks, farmers and country boys in Holdens ignored city boys hitchhiking to 
Jerusalem. At the end of the journey was Hiruharama, signifying drugs, love, 
aroha and idealized poverty. It was a place where the disenchanted young 
went to ﬁnd versions of the past – Maori, pastoral, communal – although 
most considered themselves in pursuit of an ideal future, trailblazers of 
consciousness heading away from the deadness of suburbia that Baxter calls 
ʻcivilised comaʼ in ʻThe Ballad of the Junkies and the Fuzz .ʼ3
For me, the experience of Jerusalem was not the consolidation of my 
vague anti-bourgeois ideology but the deepening of a suspicion about the 
counter culture, and especially about the drug culture. The little world of 
outcasts which Baxter conceived as a point of opposition to materialist 
and middle-class values turned out to be riddled with the snobberies and 
hierarchies of what it opposed. Up close, Baxter himself was a ﬂawed 
messiah. His taste for ﬂagellation and rumours of his heroic dedication to the 
sins of the ﬂesh were at odds with the dour conformity of Irish Catholicism 
in New Zealand. But medieval extravagances did not add glamour to the 
religion of the Christian Brothers so recently escaped, and Catholicism 
seemed an unlikely way to get laid.
The road to Jerusalem was full of students that summer. Frank McKay 
remarks that many of them ʻused the place, and then moved off. Often they 
viewed Baxter with some cynicism .ʼ4 Thirty years later, I would modify 
McKayʼs judgement on the students who did not abandon a heartless 
bourgeois world for a local version of Franciscan charity, Indian village life 
or Maori traditionalism. The fact is that they came in numbers, captivated 
as well as sceptical, prepared perhaps to believe, though few were persuaded 
to do so. Unable to adopt Baxter sʼ world-denying example, wary of his 
dramatic stances – ʻdramaticʼ in the sense of being theatrical as well as 
extreme – equivocal about his contempt for middle-class comforts, they 
nevertheless shared his desire to reform the ossiﬁed structures of Pakeha 
New Zealand.
They sensed the ﬂawed assumptions in Baxter sʼ salviﬁc social programme: 
that those rejected by society are necessarily spiritually purer than those 
caught up in it; that poverty ennobles those who willingly embrace it; 
that modern social life can be divided into the dead world of bourgeois 
materialism and the authentic world of tribal communalism. Caught between 
idealism and cynicism, the dream of a just society and the desire for self-
advancement, their ambivalence registered the difﬁculties in any response 
to a social vision as wilfully eschatological as Baxter sʼ. Nevertheless, it was 
they, not Baxter sʼ chosen tribe of the wounded and outcast, who over the 
next two decades would shift a sluggish citizenry away from its Anglophile 
dreaming into the uneasy negotiations of biculturalism. It was they who, 
as teachers, professionals and civil servants, would protest against sporting 
contact with apartheid South Africa, cast their votes for a non-nuclear New 
Zealand and support Treaty settlements. It was they who would discover 
an enthusiasm for New Zealand literature, especially books by women, 
books by and about Maori, histories and biographies. And it was they, as 
publishers, journalists, cultural bureaucrats and readers, rather than the 
artist as romantic outsider, who would move the arts into the mainstream 
of New Zealand life.
Yet Baxter sʼ inﬂuence should not be underestimated. Dying only two 
months before Norman Kirk sʼ third Labour government came to power 
in December 1972 and having identified himself so potently with the 
disenchantment of youth, Baxter provided a model for idealistic gestures of 
the period like the ohu scheme, perhaps the most curious of the changes of 
the Kirk government. The ohu were government-backed communes modelled 
chieﬂy on the kibbutz, but they drew more generally on imported alternative 
culture, localizing the communal lifestyles of California in the sixties. The 
ohu also looked back to Baxter sʼ Jerusalem and to a history of communes in 
New Zealand never before endorsed by the state. As government-sponsored 
alternatives to mainstream society, ohu were a tentative and confined 
experiment in taming Baxter sʼ errant communalism and an attempt to 
conscript the idealism he had inspired in the young.
Baxter sʼ death, as Bruce Mason put it, ʻswept the country in a huge 
wave of grief ,ʼ5 not simply because he was a famous poet but because, 
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like Janet Frame whose death also occasioned general mourning, he had 
become identiﬁed with the nation – an outsider who had entered the heart. 
His unappeased ghost lies behind the Pakeha interest in things Maori that 
made its tentative beginnings in the Kirk years and, nourished by antagonism 
to Muldoonism, sprang fully formed into national life in the mid-1980s. 
Baxter sʼ image staring mournfully from the cover of the Listener sharpened 
the conscience of the Kirk years.
Jerusalem, moreover, provided impetus for the less millenarian 
refashioning of the nation that followed Baxter sʼ death. It was a period in 
which New Zealand began the task of reinventing itself in more independent 
terms, setting the scene for the postcolonial endeavours of the 1980s. It did 
so mainly in symbolic terms: withdrawing New Zealand sʼ token contribution 
of troops from a guttering Vietnam War, cancelling the 1973 Springbok 
tour, protesting against French nuclear testing in the Paciﬁc, looking more 
positively and closely at regional ties to Asia and the Paciﬁc. The ohu scheme 
and the government sʼ attention to race relations were practical as well as 
symbolic expressions of the government sʼ idealism, but neither involved 
radical or far-reaching change. Breaking with the immediate past, they also 
repeated an older past, the former by restaging settlement in communitarian 
rather than individualistic and capitalist terms, the latter by moving between 
active redress of Maori grievances and conscripting Maori once again into 
a display of national harmony.
In imagining a future independent of its colonial history, New Zealand 
has returned again and again to that very past, alternating between the twin 
impulses that drove settlement – pragmatism and social utopianism – both 
of which aimed to produce an improved version of the world left behind. 
The seventies split apart neatly along this division. While Muldoon returned 
the country to a simpliﬁed version of its past in which settler attitudes were 
made the basis of a defensively nostalgic and often aggressive nationalism, 
the Kirk government recaptured and extended the idealism and optimism 
that also informed colonial New Zealand.
Baxter had attempted to foist on the public conscience an issue which 
the new government only equivocally addressed: not how to ʻimproveʼ race 
relations but how to change the relationship between the two main ethnic 
groups. For Baxter, this meant that Pakeha must deeply examine their 
attitudes to Maori, and the education system ʻmust become saturated in the 
knowledge of Maori language and culture .ʼ6 This was clearly beyond the scope 
or intentions of a government that would become increasingly preoccupied 
– erroneously in Baxter sʼ system of priorities – with the economy. How 
would the new government address a history of making laws deleterious to 
Maori while reiterating the language of benevolent inclusion?
As late as 1967, the Maori Affairs Amendment Act had extended the power 
of government directly to appropriate Maori land deemed ʻuneconomicʼ and 
had allowed the conversion of Maori land with four or fewer owners to the 
status of ʻEuropean land .ʼ7 Successive National governments had aimed to 
remove anomalies in law that protected Maori land. Yet rather than make 
radical reversals of existing law or initiate radical new legislation, Labour 
was content to remove the more egregious aspects of existing law. Towards 
the end of 1974, Matiu Rata, the ﬁrst Maori Minister of Maori Affairs since 
Sir Apirana Ngata, introduced the Maori Affairs Amendment Bill. The Bill 
broadened the deﬁnition of Maori to include anyone with Maori ancestry, 
doing away with the ugly obsession with percentages of ʻblood ;ʼ previously 
the deﬁnition required that one be ʻhalf-casteʼ or more. The Bill also restored 
the pre-1967 status of land held in common, tightened the provisions for 
sale of such land and allowed for inheritance according to Maori custom. 
The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975, but its brief was limited to 
the investigation of grievances from that date; it was not until 1985 that it 
was empowered to consider claims going back to 1840.
The Land March of 1975 potently indicated continuing Maori 
dissatisfaction about land loss, closing the period with an image to balance 
that of Norman Kirk on Waitangi Day 1973 striding forward conﬁdently 
with the hand of a small Maori boy in his own: that of Whina Cooper 
and her granddaughter walking slowly along a dirt road from Te Hapua 
towards a different confrontation with history. In these two images, distinct 
understandings of biculturalism are concentrated. On the one hand, Maori 
in traditional costume are led forward by the smiling representative of a 
well-meaning government; on the other, dressed in European clothes worn 
Maori-style, they disappear into the landscape, bent on their own inscrutable 
purpose. The latter image could be that of Pipi who prowls on the edge of 
settlement in Blanche Baughan sʼ 1912 story, ʻPipi on the Prowlʼ , except that 
by 1975 the goal was not a cigarette or a sixpence, but parliament and the 
preservation not just of Maori land but of culture, language and identity as 
well.8 And Whina Cooper – imaged on television and interpreted by Michael 
King – would traverse more than the outskirts of Pakeha consciousness.
The reformist energies of the early seventies were driven by two historical 
memories – Maori and Pakeha – which overlapped but did not coincide. 
Many young Pakeha shared Baxter sʼ idealism, although not necessarily 
with the same object. Young people on the political left were preoccupied 
not with the ongoing consequences of colonization on Maori but with a 
more immediate empire, America. In contrast to the old left, however, their 
oppositional ideology was liberationist like that which the Vietnam War had 
generated in America. Opposing one America, they replicated another. It was 
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an age both of idealism and of youth, drawing on the energies unleashed 
in the sixties. Norman Kirk had revitalized Labour after the 1969 defeat 
by moving away from the party sʼ conservative trade union base towards 
younger urban intellectuals, by vigorously opposing the Vietnam War and 
by bringing forward younger candidates.9
Campaigning for the 1972 election, the Party used posters depicting 
a pristine environment inside a jam jar with the caption: ʻIt sʼ preserving 
time .ʼ10 But there were different views about what needed to be preserved. 
The collective memory of Maori was both longer and more speciﬁc to New 
Zealand than that of the young or the new left. Maori were accustomed to 
Pakeha governments which saw themselves as enlightened but which acted 
against their interests. Apirana Ngata at the turn of the nineteenth century 
had pleaded for ʻa united Maori people, united for the maintenance of the 
best characteristics of the race, for its protections against well-meaning but 
cruel civilisations .ʼ11 Cruelty here was built into the purpose of advancing 
material ʻcivilisationʼ and Labour, for all its benevolent intentions, could 
not reverse the loss of land or the erosion of economic independence. At 
Jerusalem, Baxter conscripted his nga mokoi and nga raukore (the orphans 
and the wounded) into a religious vision which made them exemplary 
because they did not share in mainstream economic life; this too was a way 
of sentimentalizing Maori disadvantage. Baxter was aware of the political 
dimension facing Maori, but his overwhelming emphasis on the spiritual 
was in contrast with the mood of radical young Maori expressed in Nga 
Tamatoa.
Jerusalem was an experiment that failed in the sense that it generated 
misunderstandings and did not long survive the loss of its founding prophet.12 
But Baxter sʼ poetic accounts of the period and the myth that grew around 
Jerusalem helped prepare a climate in Pakeha consciousness for the adventure 
of biculturalism. Changes in foreign policy, attention to immigration13 and 
opposition to nuclear weapons would all prove less fundamental in shaping 
the next three decades than addressing Maori grievances. Baxter sʼ prediction 
that protests at Waitangi in 1971 meant that ʻmany Maori people will not be 
content until there are massive reparations both in land and in money for the 
wholesale seizures of the Land warsʼ was strikingly prescient.14 What could 
not have been predicted was that so many Pakeha would support Treaty 
settlements; Baxter as a mediating presence between Maori and Pakeha – a 
role assumed by Michael King without the prophetic guise – was enormously 
important in initiating Pakeha sympathy and interest in this process.
There was canny practicality in many of Baxter sʼ social prescriptions; he 
both inhabits and stands aside from the romantic tropes of his cultural heroism. 
Doubtless, his cultural programme for New Zealand was unachievable in the 
radical terms he conceived it. Baxter himself had an imperfect knowledge 
of the protocols of the people he wished so devoutly to belong among. In 
urging his estranged wife, Jacquie, herself Maori and a poet, to join him 
at Jerusalem, he failed to take into account her tribal afﬁliations. Strictly 
speaking, Jacquie Baxter did not belong there herself.15 Nevertheless, such 
scepticism needs to be tempered by recognition of the exemplary nature of 
what Baxter achieved in altering the patterns of thought that governed social 
reality for Pakeha New Zealand. Myths, misunderstandings, lies, fantasies 
have always been present in the ways each has imagined the other, especially 
so in respect of Pakeha imaginings of Maori, but so also has the ability, 
just occasionally, to glimpse sympathetically another stance towards reality 
and to direct a knowledge of that stance at the complacencies and evasions 
of settled life. At Jerusalem, both misunderstanding and insight occurred, 
but the heroic quality of the experiment produced among many Pakeha if 
not a change in consciousness then at least a receptivity towards exploring 
and reinventing their relations with Maori.
In a survey of electoral history during the seventies and eighties, Alan 
McRobie observes: ʻBeginning about 1970 the politics of stability and 
consensus gave way to the politics of volatility and increasing political 
polarization .ʼ16 McRobie starts his essay with the Labour victory of 1972, 
yet the sources of change were already present when the government came 
to power. The 1969 loss to National broadened the constituency for change 
and encouraged the recognition of new value-driven kinds of reform. The 
seventies did not introduce the politics of polarization; they merely drew 
attention to the divisions between Maori and Pakeha, young and old, city 
and small town, which could no longer be avoided. In its most optimistic 
and forward-looking moments, as well as its savage and regressive ones, 
the decade looked back unwittingly to the foundations of Pakeha culture 
in the colonial period.
George Bowering sʼ joke about New Zealand as the preserved ﬁfties used 
to be told by New Zealanders against themselves; it is the kind of self-
deprecating joke that is actually a boast, drawing attention to the country sʼ 
charmingly arrested development. At the border, sprayed against bugs, one 
entered a safer world than the world elsewhere, where the pastoral values of 
simplicity and sincerity still prevailed. Such has been the staple marketing 
strategy of New Zealand tourism since the late nineteenth century when the 
lure of ʻMaorilandʼ was spun in artistsʼ studios, visitorsʼ guides, steamship 
promotions, postcards and poems where one met not the fallen natives of 
the present but their noble warrior ancestors of myth.
Recently, the story has taken a new turn as stories circulate about how 
visitors have been surprised to ﬁnd that New Zealand has caught up, and 
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is even at the cutting edge of food, fashion, ﬁlm – all the contemporary 
signiﬁers of advanced global culture. This is a function partly of New 
Zealand sʼ reinvention of itself as a creative country, a branding exercise 
modelled on Tony Blair sʼ Cool Britannia but bolder in that the brand 
had no apparent precedents in New Zealand where the creative arts have 
traditionally been at a distance from normal life. No longer an embattled 
minority interest in a pragmatic society, creativity has become central to 
national life, spliced onto the modern economy by politicians aware of the 
ability of terms like innovation and creativity to segue proﬁtably from arts 
to business.
Both these stories involve a version of time affected by distance: in one 
case, distance produces a lag, so that one falls into the past; in the other 
case, distance somehow transports the visitor forward in time, so that one 
arrives not in a pastoral retreat but in a polished version of the present. 
Both have their sources in late colonial settler culture when New Zealand 
was invented as a land at once ancient and modern: where idealized English 
and Polynesian histories had been preserved and where advanced social 
legislation and up-to-date technologies could also be found. Martin Blythe 
points out that, in late colonial New Zealand, two worlds, one modern and 
one archaic, were placed side by side so that the tourist could step from 
one to the other: ʻMaoriland is a world outside time, a lost world even, into 
which the tourist may step brieﬂy and tantalizingly before returning to the 
luxury and comfort of the nearby hotel, and the hotel is, of course, in New 
Zealand in real historical time .ʼ17
In the seventies, actual time and imaginary time struggled for dominance. 
For a brief moment in the early seventies, settler society began a more 
clear-eyed and inclusive process of adjustment to the loss of its familiar 
bearings as Europe became more distant than it would manage later in 
the decade. Both halves of the decade repeated patterns established in the 
colonial period as well as in the sixties, but to repeat the past is probably 
inescapable; the trick is to do so not blindly and in a spirit of ﬁerce resistance 
to the lessons it contains but by drawing on its moments of generosity and 
adventure. Between the deaths of Baxter and Kirk, the country almost 
managed that trick.
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